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Becker’s (1964) seminal work on investment in human capital makes a
fundamental distinction between general and ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills, which
has implications for investment and employee turnover. Firm-speciﬁc hu-
man capital is deﬁned as having value only to the current employment re-
lationship, while general human capital is valuable to both current and po-
tential employers. Becker’s theory predicts that employees will bear the full
cost of general skills training—either by paying for training directly or by
accepting lower wages during training periods—because employers face
the threat of not capturing the return on their investment due to “poach-
ing” of trained employees by other employers. In a competitive labor mar-
ket, workers have the incentive to invest eﬃciently in general human capi-
tal because they receive a wage equal to the value of their marginal
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search.product. In the case of investment in ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital, employ-
ers and employees share the costs. Neither party is willing to bear the full
amount due to the risk of opportunistic behavior by the other. The em-
ployer and the employee share the surplus, or rents, from the investment;
the relative bargaining power of the two parties determines how these rents
are allocated.
This standard theory on investment in human capital has implications
for turnover. Investment in ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital reduces turnover
because rents accrue only if the employment relationship is maintained.
However, this result does not hold for investments in general human capi-
tal because these skills are transferable across employers. According to
standard theory, oﬀering employees general skills training would increase
turnover.
Despite the predictions of this theory, recent empirical studies show that
ﬁrms provide general training to their workers and often argue that ﬁrms
bear part of the cost.1 Tuition reimbursement programs are an example of
general skills training provided by ﬁrms. Employers reimburse employees
for direct costs of coursework taken at accredited academic institutions.
Because instruction and degree accreditation occur at third-party institu-
tions, skills acquired are transferable—as well as observable—to many 
potential employers. Hence, tuition reimbursement programs closely re-
semble general skills training as described by Becker (1964).
A primary reason ﬁrms give for oﬀering these programs is to reduce
turnover, which challenges standard human capital theory.2 This chapter
examines empirically whether employees who participate in tuition reim-
bursement have higher retention rates than nonparticipants using a case
study analysis of workers at a nonproﬁt institution. Results from the case
study indicate that participation reduces employee turnover. Hence, the
ﬁrm’s motivation for oﬀering this program is supported by this analysis:
general skills training increases retention.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 docu-
ments the prevalence of tuition reimbursement programs using the Survey
of Employer-Provided Training, 1995 (SEPT95) and describes the typical
characteristics of these programs. Section 6.3 reviews previous studies of
tuition reimbursement programs, while the case study analysis is presented
in section 6.4. Section 6.5 discusses the results from the case study, and sec-
tion 6.6 concludes the chapter.
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1. These include, but are not limited to, Loewenstein and Spletzer (1999a, b), Acemoglu
and Pischke (1998, 1999a, b), Autor (2001), and Cappelli (2004).
2. Increased retention is a response given by human resource professionals in interviews
with the author. Cappelli (2004) and the Corporate Leadership Council (2003) report the
same ﬁnding.6.2 Background on Tuition Reimbursement Programs
6.2.1 Program Prevalence
Employer-provided tuition reimbursement programs are widespread
and constitute a nontrivial part of nonwage compensation. One of the few
data sets that collects information on tuition reimbursement programs is
SEPT95. This survey collects information on employer-provided training
practices for a cross section of establishments. The survey was conducted
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), part of the U.S. Department of
Labor, from May to August of 1995, with the purpose of collecting nation-
ally representative data (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1996). The sample rep-
resents private, nonagriculture establishments employing ﬁfty or more
workers. The results from SEPT95 show that a substantial fraction of ﬁrms
oﬀer tuition reimbursement: 61 percent of establishments employing 
ﬁfty or more workers oﬀer tuition reimbursement programs. Using the
1994 National Employer Survey of Educational Quality in the Workforce
(NES-EQW), Black and Lynch (1998) report that 47 percent of ﬁrms em-
ploying twenty or more employees oﬀer tuition reimbursement programs.
The estimates from SEPT95 and 1994 NES-EQW are comparable because
larger establishments are more likely to oﬀer a tuition reimbursement pro-
gram (Frazis et al. 1998; Frazis, Gittleman, and Joyce 2000). Examining
the access of workers to this program, over three-quarters of the employ-
ees who work in establishments represented in SEPT95 are oﬀered tuition
reimbursement by their employer.
In addition, the amount spent on these programs is substantial: estab-
lishments represented in SEPT95 spent $2.8 billion in 1994 on tuition 
reimbursement.3 The trade magazine Workforce Management estimates
that companies paid $10 billion toward tuition reimbursements in 2003.4
Hence, expenditures on tuition reimbursement programs represent a sig-
niﬁcant source of investment in general skills of employees and appear to
be on the rise. However, these programs are relatively unexamined in the
academic literature. This chapter examines the eﬀect of participation in the
tuition reimbursement program oﬀered by the case study institution on 
the propensity of an employee to separate from his or her employer.
6.2.2 Program Characteristics
Tuition reimbursement programs typically consist of three components:
(1) a maximum reimbursement amount; (2) an eligibility requirement; and
(3) a reimbursement policy based on academic performance. The ﬁrst
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3. The conﬁdence interval for this estimate ranges from $2.6 billion to $3.0 billion (1994
U.S. dollars).
4. See Workforce Management, May 1, 2004.characteristic is aﬀected by the tax-advantage status of these programs. Re-
imbursements from employer-provided programs are exempt from income
taxation under Section 127 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code.5 The maxi-
mum income exclusion for a single calendar year is $5,250, and reimburse-
ments under this level are exempt from federal income tax, payroll tax, and
state income tax. A 2002 survey by Eduventures of human resource pro-
fessionals and managers at over 500 ﬁrms ﬁnds that 70 percent of ﬁrms
oﬀering a tuition reimbursement program cap annual reimbursement, and
over half of these ﬁrms (57 percent) have maximums that exceed $4,000
(Newman and Stein 2003).6 Table 6.1 shows the distribution of reimburse-
ment maximums from the Eduventures’ survey. The majority of ﬁrms
choose maximums below or equal to the maximum annual tax exclusion,
$5,250, but a sizable fraction of ﬁrms have reimbursement maximums that
exceed the tax exempt limit or have no maximum reimbursement amount.
Among ﬁrms oﬀering tuition beneﬁts, nearly 40 percent oﬀer reimburse-
ments beyond the level that receives tax-advantaged status (i.e., amounts
greater than $5,250). The fact that ﬁrms set annual limits in excess of the
tax exempt amount provides evidence that these programs are not solely
oﬀered because of their tax-advantaged status.7
Most ﬁrms in the Eduventures’ survey allow employees to become eli-
gible for the program after six months of service; rarely do eligibility re-
quirements exceed one year. Twenty percent of ﬁrms in the survey impose
service requirements after participation. Service requirements after par-
ticipation are more common in plans that have unlimited tuition reim-
bursement. The survey also reports that over 90 percent of programs have
a minimum grade standard for reimbursement, typically set at a “C” or
better. Many companies tie grades directly to reimbursement percentages,
making the cost of participation higher for workers who receive lower
grades. The tuition reimbursement program oﬀered at the case study insti-
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5. Section 127 of the Internal Revenue Code outlines the tax-advantaged status of educa-
tional assistance plans provided by employers: “Gross income of an employee does not in-
clude amounts paid or expenses incurred by the employer for educational assistance to the
employee if the assistance is furnished pursuant to a [educational assistance] program” (26
U.S.C.§ 127).
6. The survey was sponsored by Cenquest, a provider of managed education solutions,
which helps companies create and manage tuition assistance programs (http://www
.cenquest.com). Eduventures, who conducted the survey, is an independent research and ad-
visory ﬁrm of corporate, postsecondary, and pre–K-12 learning markets (http://www
.eduventures.com).
7. A common reaction to tuition reimbursement programs is to only attribute their provi-
sion by ﬁrms to their tax-advantaged status. However, this overlooks the trade-oﬀ between
wage and nonwage compensation. If total compensation reﬂects the value of a worker’s mar-
ginal product, then beneﬁts and wages are substitutes at the margin. Firms oﬀer tuition re-
imbursement program instead of additional wages or other beneﬁts if tuition beneﬁts are
more eﬀective at attracting or retaining a certain type of worker. The tax-advantaged status
of tuition reimbursement programs increases the value of these beneﬁts to a worker facing a
positive tax rate, but it cannot explain the eﬀect of these programs on recruitment or turnover.tution has an eligibility requirement of one year of service and does not
have a service requirement after participation. The maximum reimburse-
ment amount is $5,250 for a single year, and the program only reimburses
costs of tuition for participants obtaining a “C” grade or better. Hence, the
case study program is typical in its reimbursement amount and require-
ments, making it a good candidate for case study analysis.
6.3 Literature on Tuition Reimbursement Programs
The primary reasons given by ﬁrms as to why they oﬀer tuition reim-
bursement programs are recruitment and employee retention. The ﬁrst
reason suggests that tuition reimbursement is a nonwage beneﬁt that
aﬀects the type of workers attracted to the ﬁrm. One potential mechanism
behind the second reason is that tuition reimbursement programs increase
employee retention by making the worker more productive at the current
ﬁrm relative to outside employers. The remainder of this section outlines
the existing literature on these two given motivations and discusses the
handful of studies on tuition reimbursement.
6.3.1 Tuition Reimbursement Programs and Recruitment
The use of beneﬁts as a recruiting device is prevalent in labor and per-
sonnel economics. Rosen’s (1986) work on “equalizing diﬀerences” estab-
lishes a theory for how nonwage beneﬁts aﬀect the composition of workers
attracted to a ﬁrm. In the case of tuition reimbursement, workers who
value continuing education are willing to trade oﬀ wages (at some rate) for
tuition payments. This trade-oﬀ implies that at least part of the incidence
of tuition reimbursement is on the worker. Employers may ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to attract such workers if a preference for continued education is correlated
with unobservable characteristics, such as ability or motivation.
Cappelli (2004) addresses the eﬀect of tuition reimbursement programs
on recruitment by developing a model such that provision of these pro-
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Table 6.1 Distribution of maximum reimbursements for tuition programs








No. of observations 434
Source: Newman and Stein (2003).grams generates a separating equilibrium in which only high-ability work-
ers choose to work at ﬁrms with a tuition program. His model includes two
types of agents, low-ability and high-ability, in which ability is known to
the worker, but unknown to the ﬁrm. Participation in a tuition reimburse-
ment program is assumed to reveal the worker’s type to all potential em-
ployers because certiﬁcation takes place outside the ﬁrm. Because partici-
pation is assumed to be more costly to workers of low ability, wages can be
set such that all high-ability types participate and no low-ability types par-
ticipate. Hence, in his model, ﬁrms use tuition reimbursement programs as
a screening device to attract high-ability workers. Using educational at-
tainment as a proxy for ability, Cappelli tests his theory using the 1997
NES-EQW and ﬁnds that the average education attainment of new hires is
higher for ﬁrms with tuition reimbursement programs, which is consistent
with his theory if educational attainment is a direct measure of ability.
However, the sharp prediction of his model—all high-ability types par-
ticipate—is inconsistent with empirical participation rates. Participation
rates in tuition reimbursement programs by employees are typically
around 5 percent.8 The Corporate Leadership Council (CLC; 2003) re-
ports that low participation rates could be due to a lack of marketing by
ﬁrms. If employees lack information about the program, it cannot inﬂu-
ence an employee’s selection of an employer.
Aside from the sharp predictions and possible shortcoming listed in the
preceding paragraph, the general idea of Cappelli’s (2004) model is attrac-
tive because it is consistent with Rosen’s (1986) prior work. The low par-
ticipation rates found empirically could be reconciled in his model by
thinking of workers as attaching an option value to participation: nonpar-
ticipants at ﬁrms that oﬀer the program could be systematically diﬀerent
(i.e., of higher ability) than workers at ﬁrms that do not oﬀer this program
if high-ability workers are willing to trade oﬀ wages for the option of par-
ticipating in the future. Data on how implementation of a tuition reim-
bursement program aﬀects the applicant pool would be ideal to test the
eﬀect of these programs on recruitment. However, this type of data is diﬃ-
cult to obtain. Results from the case study in section 6.4 provide some evi-
dence that implementation of a tuition reimbursement program aﬀects
employee composition because both the determinants of participation and
the eﬀect of participation on retention are diﬀerent for new hires relative
to those employees hired before the program was implemented.
6.3.2 Tuition Reimbursement and Retention
In contrast to using tuition beneﬁts as a recruiting device, the claim by
ﬁrms that they use tuition reimbursement programs to reduce turnover
does not have support in the theoretical literature. Rather, the theoretical
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8. References include the Corporate Leadership Council (2003), statistics from Watson
Wyatt, and conversations with human resource (HR) personnel at ﬁrms with a program.literature predicts the opposite: provision of general skills training would
increase turnover. Becker’s (1964) theory of investment in human capital
argues that, because general skills are fully transferable (by deﬁnition),
ﬁrms risk having their trained employees poached or “cherry-picked” by
outside ﬁrms if they provide workers with general skills training. The labor
market is assumed to be competitive with the worker’s wage set equal to the
value of her marginal product. Becker’s theory implies that the worker
bears the full cost of general training because she captures the full return
on the investment. Because the market is competitive and skills are trans-
ferable, the worker is indiﬀerent between employers. Therefore, even if the
incidence of general skills training falls on the worker, turnover would be
nondecreasing in the provision of general skills training. This disconnect
between the theoretical literature and the intended use of these programs
by ﬁrms presents an opportunity to analyze empirically the eﬀect of tuition
reimbursement programs on retention.
There are a handful of studies that examine the tuition reimbursement
programs oﬀered by the U.S. Department of Defense.9 The two studies
most similar in their econometric methodology to the case study analysis
in this paper are Arkes, Garcia, and Trost (2000) and Buddin and Kapur
(2005), which both examine the impact of tuition reimbursement on reten-
tion in the U.S. Navy. Arkes, Garcia, and Trost (2000) follow a cohort of
enlistees who began service in 1992 and study the eﬀect of participation on
the probability of remaining with the Navy for at least six years. They ﬁnd
that participation increases the probability of staying in the Navy by nearly
13 percentage points.
Buddin and Kapur (2005) ﬁnd the opposite: participation in tuition re-
imbursement decreases the probability of reenlisting after four years by 16.5
percentage points. Buddin and Kapur criticize Arkes, Garcia, and Trost’s
(2000) deﬁnition of retention and instead use reenlistment after the end of
a four-year contract as the relevant measure. Buddin and Kapur (2005) ar-
gue that the time window for which enlistees have access to participation in
tuition reimbursement should be held ﬁxed, so they limit their sample only
to those enlistees who served a full four-year contract. These two studies
also diﬀer in the variables used as exclusion restrictions in their bivariate
probit estimation: Arkes, Garcia, and Trost (2000) use participation in the
orientation session for educational opportunities oﬀered to enlistees, while
Buddin and Kapur (2005) use the enlistee’s proximity to a four-year college
before enlistment and an interaction between the number of courses oﬀered
on base and the size of the base. Buddin and Kapur argue that the instru-
ment used by Arkes, Garcia, and Trost (2000) fails the exogeneity test.10
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9. These include Boesel and Johnson (1988), Garcia, Joy, and Reese (1998), Arkes, Garcia,
and Trost (2000), Buddin and Kapur (2002), and Buddin and Kapur (2005).
10. Participation in the orientation session is not random; it is positively correlated with an
individual’s intention to use the program. Therefore, Buddin and Kapur (2005) argue that it
is correlated with the probability of staying in the Navy.While the exclusion restriction in Arkes, Garcia, and Trost (2000) is un-
tenable, this chapter does not agree with Buddin and Kapur’s (2005) criti-
cism that the window of opportunity for participation needs to be held
constant for “leavers” and “stayers.” If enlistees jointly determine their
participation and retention decisions, constraining the duration of service
to be the same across participants and nonparticipants imposes restric-
tions on the eﬀect of the program. By using diﬀerent criteria for their
samples, Arkes, Garcia, and Trost (2000) and Buddin and Kapur (2005)
are addressing slightly diﬀerent research questions. Arkes, Garcia, and
Trost (2000) examine the eﬀect of participation on the probability of stay-
ing six years, while Buddin and Kapur (2005) analyze the eﬀect of partici-
pation on the probability of staying a ﬁfth year after already completing
four years with the Navy. Even in the absence of these complications, gen-
eralizing results from the Armed Services to civilian workers is diﬃcult due
to the fundamentally diﬀerent employment relationship.
Benson, Finegold, and Mohrman (2004) present an analysis of the im-
pact of participation in tuition reimbursement on retention using a case
study of a large U.S. manufacturing ﬁrm (roughly 10,000 civilian employ-
ees). Employees at this ﬁrm have a high participation rate in the tuition pro-
gram—nearly 60 percent—which may be due to the program’s unlimited
reimbursement of tuition, stock rewards for degree completion, and the fact
that the ﬁrm strives to be a leader in the provision of continued education
for its workers. This number is also inﬂated because it includes individuals
who took only a single course rather than limiting the sample to those en-
rolled in a degree program. Hence, their study examines an atypical tuition
reimbursement program in terms of characteristics and participation rates.
Benson, Finegold, and Mohrman (2004) use a Cox-proportional hazard
model to analyze how participation and degree completion aﬀect the
probability of leaving the ﬁrm between January 1996 and June 2000. They
propose a theory in which promotion after degree completion would re-
duce the probability of leaving because it produces a better match between
responsibilities and skill sets. However, their theory falls short of fully ex-
plaining their empirical ﬁndings. They ﬁnd that promotion decreases the
probability of leaving for employees who obtain a graduate degree. How-
ever, these individuals still have a greater probability of leaving the ﬁrm
than nonparticipants, and promotion does not aﬀect the turnover propen-
sity for those employees earning either a bachelor’s or an associate’s de-
gree. Another possible source for concern is the authors’ assumption that
the eﬀect of participation on the separation hazard is proportional because
the authors make note of a sharp increase in the hazard upon degree com-
pletion. In addition, their analysis assumes that participation in the tuition
program is exogenous to the employee’s retention decision. A major ad-
vantage to the Benson, Finegold, and Mohrman study is the data used in
their analysis because it allows current participants to be distinguished
from those who have completed degree programs. Overall, however, it is
204 Colleen Flaherty Manchesterdiﬃcult to generalize their ﬁndings to other establishments because the in-
stitution they analyze is an outlier in terms of program characteristics and
due to the methodological shortcomings.
While few studies examine tuition reimbursement programs, there have
been many studies that examine the provision of general skills training by
employers. These studies develop models in which a variety of mecha-
nisms, such as asymmetric information or mobility costs, create a wedge
between wages and productivity. This wedge provides ﬁrms with an incen-
tive to oﬀer and pay for general skills training.11These studies, however, do
not focus on the eﬀect of general training on employee retention.
This chapter empirically evaluates the eﬀect of employer-provided gen-
eral training—provided through tuition reimbursement programs—on
employee attachment to the ﬁrm. It contributes to the literature by exam-
ining the eﬀect of these programs on the retention of civilian workers using
a program that is typical in terms of its characteristics. Additionally, this
analysis accounts for the interdependence between an employee’s partici-
pation and retention decisions.
6.4 Case Study Program (CSP)
To examine the impact of tuition reimbursement programs on employee
retention, this chapter analyzes data from a single employer. This section
presents the program characteristics, an econometric framework, and the
results from analyzing the case study program. The data were obtained
from a nonproﬁt institution that implemented a tuition reimbursement
program in September 1999. The case study program will be referred to as
CSP in the remainder of this chapter. Employees included in this analysis
are staﬀ members in supervisory and nonsupervisory positions who were
employed on December 15, 1999, and those who were hired between De-
cember 15, 1999, and September 1, 2001. There are nearly 8,000 employees
in total. A panel of observations was constructed based on seven “point-
in-time” observations from administrative records. Individuals are ob-
served on December 15 of each year from 1999 to 2005. The data include
information on gender, age, and race as well as start date, job characteris-
tics, and annual wage rates. One shortcoming of the data is that those em-
ployees who start and end employment between December 15 of one year
and December 15 of the subsequent year are not included in the sample.
An additional shortcoming is that the data do not distinguish voluntary
separations from involuntary separations.12 Individual records of partici-
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11. These include, but are not limited to, Black and Lynch (1998), Loewenstein and Splet-
zer (1999a, b) and Acemoglu and Pischke (1998, 1999a, b), and Autor (2001).
12. Being able to distinguish between the two would improve our understanding of how
these programs aﬀect employee attachment; however, this is not possible using these data.
Historically, this employer has not used mass layoﬀs, and most separations appear to have
been voluntary.pation in CSP include the amount reimbursed, the degree type, and the ma-
jor or area of concentration for those participating from September 1,
1999, to August 31, 2004.13The amount reimbursed over these ﬁve years to-
taled nearly two million dollars (in 2001 U.S. dollars), with a participation
rate of 5.0 percent.14
6.4.1 CSP Characteristics and Data
As mentioned in section 6.2, employees are required to have one year of
service to be eligible for CSP. Employees need to be admitted into a degree
program, but the program does not need to be job-related. The employee’s
supervisor must approve the request to participate in CSP, but this is not a
binding constraint because the employee can appeal directly to the bene-
ﬁts department for reimbursement if his or her supervisor does not grant
the request. A staﬀ member working full time (more than thirty hours per
week) qualiﬁes for $5,250 in reimbursement per year; this amount is pro-
rated for members working part time. The maximum reimbursement
amount was $2,000 for the ﬁrst two years of the program, September 1,
1999, through August 31, 2001, but was increased to $5,250 as of Septem-
ber 1, 2001. CSP qualiﬁes under Section 127 of the Internal Revenue Code,
allowing reimbursements to be exempt from income and payroll taxation.
Under CSP, reimbursements are only allowable for the cost of tuition. Tu-
ition reimbursements are made directly to the institution prior to the quar-
ter or semester. The employee assumes responsibility of satisfactory com-
pletion of the course (grade of C or better); if not, the funds must be repaid
in total to the employer.
Table 6.2 displays descriptive statistics of worker characteristics for
those used in the analysis. Participants in CSP diﬀer from nonparticipat-
ing employees in terms of observable demographic and employment char-
acteristics. Participants are younger, are more likely to identify themselves
as black, have a lower starting wage, and are less likely to be in a supervi-
sory role.15Of those who participated between September 1, 1999, and Au-
gust 31, 2004, the average total reimbursement amount was nearly $5,200,
and participants spent an average of two years in the program.
The participation rate of an employee’s peers is also higher for partici-
pants. Peer groups were constructed using both the location of an em-
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13. Major, or area of study, was not available for twenty-two participants.
14. Participation is measured as having ever participated in the program. It is important to
note that data on participation in CSP is only available through August 31, 2004; therefore,
this rate likely underestimates actual participation. In particular, this participation rate only
includes two years of participation behavior for employees hired in 2001.
15. Workers are categorized as supervisors if they are “exempt,” while “nonexempt” work-
ers are those in nonsupervisory positions. Exempt and nonexempt refer to whether the em-
ployee is subject to the U.S. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), which establishes min-
imum wage and overtime pay laws for full-time and part-time workers in the private and
government sectors. Workers who are nonexempt from FLSA are those paid on an hourly ba-
sis and occupy nonsupervisory positions; the salary of exempt workers must also meet the
minimum wage.ployee’s division and the general classiﬁcation of his or her job to deﬁne 
a group of workers whose participation behavior could inﬂuence an indi-
vidual employee’s participation decision, such as through the dissemination
of information about the program. The peer participation rate assigned to
each employee does not include that particular employee’s participation be-
havior. This variable is used later in the paper as an exclusion restriction in
the econometric analysis of the eﬀect of participation on retention.
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 show the (unconditional) retention behavior of non-
participants and participants. The raw data show that participants have
higher retention rates than nonparticipants for each year of service. The
largest diﬀerence in the separation percentages occurs at the three-year
mark, but the diﬀerence still persists at the ﬁve-year mark. Whether the
worker separates from the institution before ﬁve years is the primary out-
come evaluated in this study. Unfortunately, the data do not contain infor-
mation on degree completion, so the retention behavior of participants
after completing their coursework cannot be directly examined. The ﬁve-
year time window is used as an approximation for degree completion.
Figure 6.1 graphically displays the diﬀerence between participants and
nonparticipants in their propensities to separate from the institution by
plotting Kaplan-Meier survival functions. These survival functions use ac-
tual employment start dates, but the end dates are randomly assigned to a
date in the year in which the employee leaves the institution, which pro-
duces a relatively smooth curve.16The survival function of participants lies
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Table 6.2 Comparing nonparticipants to participants
Employee characteristics Nonparticipants Participants
Female (%) 70.6 73.8
Age 40.7 34.5**
White (%) 68.3 62.8**
Black (%) 5.4 10.7**
Hispanic (%) 7.9 9.7
Asian (%) 18.4 16.8
Initial weekly wage ($2001) 1,393 1,225**
Nonsupervisor (nonexempt, %) 41.9 52.1**
Supervisor (exempt, %) 58.1 47.1**
Leave before 5 years (%) 47.1 33.2**
Years in tuition program 1.96
Tuition spending (nominal, $) 5,169
Participation rate of peers (%) 2.8 3.2**
No. of observations 7,291 382
**Statistically different at the 5 percent signiﬁcance level.
16. For employees hired before September 1999, length of service is measured as the diﬀer-
ence between implementation of the program (September 1, 1999) and the employee’s end
date or censoring date (December 15, 2005) when applicable.Table 6.4 Retention of nonparticipants (unconditional)
% leave before:
Year hired Number 3 years 4 years 5 years
Before Sept. 1999a 4,980 31.7 37.3 42.3
Sept. 1999–Dec. 1999 264 48.5 9.1 63.6
2000 1,199 40.6 20.8 57.8
2001 848 43.4 53.1 59.2
aService length is measured as of ﬁrst year observed (Dec. 15, 1999).
Table 6.3 Retention of participants (unconditional)
% leave before:
Year hired Number 3 years 4 years 5 years
Before Sept. 1999a 242 14.5 21.5 30.2
Sept. 1999–Dec. 1999 11 0.0 9.1 36.4
2000 72 12.5 20.8 33.3
2001 57 24.6 31.6 45.6
aService length is measured as of ﬁrst year observed (Dec. 15, 1999).
Fig. 6.1 Kaplan-Meier survival function plots by participation status (all hires)to the right of nonparticipants, meaning that for any year of service, par-
ticipants are more likely to still be employed at the institution. Diﬀerences
in survival rates are largest just before three years of service. Figure 6.2
charts the survival functions for workers hired after September 1999 (i.e.,
hired after CSP was introduced).
Figures 6.3 and 6.4 graph the survival function by degree type and ma-
jor pursued. Survival rates diﬀer by the type of degree pursued: partici-
pants enrolled in undergraduate programs have higher survival rates than
those in graduate programs (ﬁgure 6.3). The analysis in the next section ex-
amines whether this diﬀerence between degrees persists after controlling
for individual characteristics.
While not a part of the administrative record, the relevance of the par-
ticipant’s major to their current job title was imputed. Participants were
classiﬁed as pursuing a job-related major unless the discrepancy was large
(i.e., a computer technician pursuing a major in art history) in an attempt
to uncover a “lower bound” for the eﬀect of participation on separation,
meaning the eﬀect of participation on retention that can be attributed to
the service length requirement prior to eligibility and the fact that the
worker needs to continue employment through the completion of his or her
course in order to receive reimbursement. As seen in ﬁgure 6.4, the survival
rate of participants is higher for the ﬁrst few years of service even for those
pursuing majors that are vastly unrelated to their job. The survival func-
tion for those pursuing majors that are at least somewhat job-related is to
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Fig. 6.2 Kaplan-Meier survival function plots by participation status (new hires)Fig. 6.3 Kaplan-Meier survival function plots by degree pursued (all hires)
Fig. 6.4 Kaplan-Meier survival function plots by major pursued (all hires)the right of the survival function of nonparticipants; the right shift persists
beyond ﬁve years of service.
6.4.2 Estimation
This section models the event of an employee leaving the institution us-
ing a latent variable framework. The individual compares the utility from
staying with the employer to that obtained from separating. The propen-
sity to separate from the employer is a continuous variable, but the ob-
served outcome is binary, taking a value equal to 1 if the individual sepa-
rates, and equal to 0 otherwise. The likelihood of leaving depends on
observable characteristics, X, participation in CSP, P, and factors unob-
servable to the researcher, ε. Let S∗ be the underlying index—unobserv-
able to the researcher—that determines whether the individual separates
from the employer within a speciﬁed time frame:
(1) S∗   X     P   ε
(2) S   
If we assume ε to have a standard normal distribution, then we can esti-
mate how worker characteristics aﬀect the probability of separating from
the institution using a probit model.
The same framework can be applied to participation in CSP because
participation is also a binary outcome. Let P∗be the underlying latent vari-
able that determines whether the individual participates, while Z repre-
sents individual characteristics, and let u be unobservable characteristics.
Again, the individual compares the utility from participating to that from
not participating:
(3) P∗   Z     u
(4) P   
As with the analysis of the probability of separation, determinants of par-
ticipation can be examined using a probit model if uhas a standard normal
distribution.
If participation in CSP were exogenous in equation (1), then   would
measure the eﬀect of participation in CSP on the probability of separation.
For participation to be exogenous, the decision to participate cannot be re-
lated to the decision to leave the employer in terms of unobservable charac-
teristics, or cov(ε,u)  0. However, because participation in CSP aﬀects em-
ployment and promotion opportunities due to an increase in general skills,
arguing that the two decisions are uncorrelated is tenuous. This chapter
1 if P∗   0 ⇔ Z      u
0 if P∗   0 ⇔ Z      u.
1 if S∗   0 ⇔ X      P    ε
0 if S∗   0 ⇔ X      P    ε
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endogenous in equation (1), or that cov(ε,u)   0. The distribution of (ε,u)
is assumed to be bivariate standard normal with cov(ε,u)   corr(ε,u)    , 
or that:
(5)    ~ BVN     ,     .
Equations (1) and (2) are estimated jointly using bivariate probit maximum
likelihood estimation. Arkes, Garcia, and Trost (2000) and Buddin and
Kapur (2005) use this technique in their studies of the U.S. Navy. In order
to estimate the model, Z in equation (3) should include a variable that
aﬀects the probability of participating, but does not aﬀect the probability
of leaving (i.e., not contained in X from equation [1]). This chapter uses an
information eﬀect or knowledge “spillover,” measured by the participation
rate of peers, to satisfy this exclusion restriction. Peer groups were created
based on the division (eighteen in total) in which the employee worked and
a broadly deﬁned job classiﬁcation (administrative, professional, or man-
ager). The participation rate of peers attached to each individual does not
include the participation decision of that particular individual. This rate is
used as a measure of how informed an individual is about CSP.17
Because the sample consists of both employees hired before and after the
implementation of CSP, the empirical analysis will be conducted on two
groups: (1) employees hired before September 1, 1999; and (2) employees
hired on or after September 1, 1999. The groups need to be separated be-
cause, as discussed in section 6.3.1, implementation of CSP could aﬀect the
applicant pool. The eﬀect of CSP on retention for future hires will be de-
termined based on results collected from the second group, which is the
measure most applicable to ﬁrms who have an established program. If a
ﬁrm is considering implementing a tuition reimbursement program, the
eﬀect of CSP on current and future workers is relevant.
6.4.3 Results from Case Study
Before analyzing the probability of separating from the establishment,
this section ﬁrst examines determinants of participation. Table 6.5 shows
the marginal eﬀects from estimating the probability of participating in CSP
using a probit model. The estimates in column (1) are for workers hired be-
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17. The direction of the eﬀect in unclear: Does the participation of peers inform the indi-
vidual or does participation by the individual inform her peers? To address this, a robustness
check was performed that assigned the current year’s participation rate to newly hires em-
ployees by peer group. Because these new workers were not eligible to participate in the ﬁrst
year due to the one-year service requirement, the direction of this information eﬀect is clear.
This alternative measure of peer participation rates does not aﬀect the results.this group, women are more likely to participate than men as well as are
individuals identifying themselves as black (relative to those identifying
themselves as white); individuals identifying themselves as Asian are less
likely to participate. While the magnitudes for the marginal eﬀects seem
small, they are substantial when compared to the participate rate: 4.6 per-
cent of workers hired before September 1, 1999, participate, while 5.7 per-
cent of those hired on or after September 1, 1999, participate in CSP (this
diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level).
For workers hired after the introduction of CSP, the probability of par-
ticipation is increasing in the starting wage rate and workers in nonsuper-
visory positions are more likely to participate than those in supervisory
roles. An additional method for examining determinants of participation
is to look at reimbursement amounts, such as the highest annual fraction
of reimbursement received by workers (nonparticipants are given a value
of zero). Table 6.6 shows the results from using a tobit model; the ﬁndings
closely resemble those in table 6.5.
The next set of results estimate the eﬀect of participation in CSP on the
probability of separating from the employer (voluntarily or involuntarily)
within ﬁve years when participation is treated as exogenous. Table 6.7 lists
the marginal eﬀects from estimating a probit model on the decision to sep-
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Table 6.5 Determinants of participating in case study program (CSP)
Hired before Hired after















Ln of weekly wage (in thousands), $2001 –0.012 0.037
(0.011) (0.017)**
Log-likelihood –922.3 –517.9
No. of observations 5,222 2,451
Note: Numbers reﬂect dF/dX values; standard errors in parentheses.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.arate from the case study institution. For workers hired before CSP was im-
plemented, S   1 if they separate within ﬁve years measured from Sep-
tember 1, 1999 (start date of CSP); and S   0 otherwise. For workers hired
after implementation, S   1 if they separate within ﬁve years of their hire
date; and S   0 otherwise. Individual and employment characteristics,
such as age, weekly wage, and years of service, are taken as of December
15 of the ﬁrst year observed. Participation in CSP, P is equal to 1 if the in-
dividual ever participated in the program beginning September 1, 1999,
through August 31, 2004. This binary variable deﬁnition is used most often
in this analysis because of the intensity at which workers use the program.
Table 6.7 also includes results from using the maximum fraction of annual
reimbursement received as a measure of participation; the ﬁndings are sim-
ilar to those using the binary deﬁnition.
As seen in table 6.7, if participation in CSP were exogenous, participa-
tion would lower the probability of separating by over 20 percentage points
for employees hired before or after September 1, 1999. This impact on re-
tention is equivalent to the eﬀect of being three and a half years older, or
having six additional years of experience (as of December 15, 1999) for
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Table 6.6 Determinants of case study program (CSP) reimbursement amount
Tobit model (LHS: Hired before Hired after




















No. of observations 5,222 2,451
Note: Numbers reﬂect value of coefﬁcient; standard errors in parentheses.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.those employees hired before September 1999. For recent hires, the eﬀect
is similar to being four and half years older or having a $750 increase in the
worker’s starting weekly wage.
Table 6.8shows the results from examining the eﬀect of participation on
retention separately for undergraduate and graduate degrees while still
treating participation as exogenous. The eﬀect of pursuing an undergrad-
uate degree in CSP is roughly one and a half times as large as the eﬀect of
pursuing a graduate degree across the two groups. However, if participa-
tion is endogenous, these estimates of how participation in CSP aﬀects re-
tention are inconsistent.
To allow for interdependence between participation and retention deci-
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Table 6.7 Determinants of separating from ﬁrm within 5 years
Hired before Sept. 1999 Hired after Sept. 1999
Probit model (LHS: Pr[S = 1]) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Participation in CSP –0.207 –0.218
(0.027)*** (0.043)***
Maximum annual reimbursement (fraction) –0.303 –0.238
(0.044)*** (0.065)***
Female 0.029 0.029 0.003 0.003
(0.016)* (0.016)* (0.023) (0.023)
Age –0.066 –0.066 –0.048 –0.048
(0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)***
Age2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Black 0.042 0.044 –0.024 –0.026
(0.032) (0.032) (0.047) (0.047)
Hispanic –0.060 –0.060 –0.096 –0.095
(0.026)** (0.026)** (0.039)** (0.039)**
Asian –0.092 –0.091 –0.117 –0.120
(0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.026)** (0.026)***
Service lengtha –0.034 –0.034 0.048 0.042
(0.003)*** (0.003)** (0.158) (0.158)
Service length2 0.001 0.001 –0.182 –0.177
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.153) (0.153)
Nonsupervisor –0.024 –0.023 –0.142 –0.144
(0.019) (0.019) (0.028)*** (0.028)***
Ln of weekly wage (in thousands), $2001 –0.002 0.001 –0.293 –0.295
(0.027) (0.027) (0.042)*** (0.042)***
Log-likelihood –3,165.9 –3,162.9 –1,550.3 –1,555.6
No. of observations 5,222 5,222 2,451 2,451
Note: Numbers reﬂect dF/dX values; standard errors in parentheses.
aMeasured as of Dec. 15 of initial year observed.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.sions, bivariate probit maximum likelihood estimation is used and the cor-
relation between the unobservable characteristics aﬀecting these decisions
is estimated. As mentioned in section 6.4.2, the participation rate of an in-
dividual’s peer group is used for the exclusion restriction that is required
for the estimation. One concern is that the members of peer group could all
be aﬀected by some exogenous shock that aﬀects both their participation
and retention behavior (such as a “supervisor eﬀect”).18 However, because
applications for reimbursement through CSP are handled by a central pro-
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18. The type of exogenous shock that would be problematic is one that aﬀects both the par-
ticipation and separation propensities of the group, such that the participation behavior of
peers could not be excluded from the individual’s separation decision.
Table 6.8 Determinants of separating from ﬁrm within 5 years, by degree
Hired before Hired after 
Probit model (LHS: Pr[S = 1]) Sept. 1999 (1) Sept. 1999 (2)
Graduate degree in CSP –0.169 –0.182
(0.036)*** (0.053)***














Service lengtha 0.034 0.047
(0.003)*** (0.158)




Ln of weekly wage (in thousands), $2001 –0.001 –0.292
(0.027) (.042)***
Log-likelihood –3,164.4 –1,549.6
No. of observations 5,222 2,451
Note: Numbers reﬂect dF/dX values; standard errors in parentheses.
aMeasured as of Dec. 15 of initial year observed.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.gram administrator, this shock is less of a concern. In addition, there is an
opportunity to switch departments within the institution in the event of a
poor supervisor-worker paring—over 18 percent of individuals made
moves that landed them in a diﬀerent peer group in a span of ﬁve years.
Furthermore, peer groups were also constructed at the department level
(twenty-three groups instead of the original seventy-one) to mitigate the
eﬀect of an exogenous shock; the ﬁndings are robust to this diﬀerent spec-
iﬁcation.
Table 6.9 displays the marginal eﬀects from the estimation on those em-
ployees hired before September 1, 1999. As reported earlier, the probabil-
ity of participation is signiﬁcantly higher for females relative to males and
for blacks (relative to those identifying themselves as white); workers iden-
tifying themselves as Asian are less likely to participate. In addition to
these individual characteristics, the participation rate by peers is included
as a determinant of participating in CSP, but not included as a factor that
aﬀects the probability of separating from the employer. The probability of
participating in CSP increases in step with the participation rate of peers:
a 1 percent increase in the participation rate of peers increases an individ-
ual’s probability of participating by 0.9 percentage points. The second set
of estimates in table 6.9 corresponds to the probability of separating from
the ﬁrm. The probability of separating is decreasing (at a decreasing rate)
in age and experience and is signiﬁcantly lower for Hispanics and Asians
(relative to white workers). As opposed to the estimates in table 6.7, where
participation was assumed to be exogenous, the eﬀect of participation in
CSP on turnover is positive, but not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for
this group. The change in the magnitude of the estimate can be attributed
to the negative correlation between the unobservable characteristics. A
negative correlation implies that individuals (hired before September 1,
1999) who participated in CSP were predisposed to staying at the institu-
tion and, thus, the program did not signiﬁcantly aﬀect their retention be-
havior.
Table 6.10 presents the results from the joint estimation of the probabil-
ity of participating in CSP and separating from the employer within ﬁve
years for workers hired on or after September 1, 1999. For these workers,
participation in CSP is signiﬁcantly higher for workers in a nonsupervisory
role and is increasing in the starting wage: a $100 higher starting weekly
wage corresponds to a 0.43 percentage point increase in the probability of
participating in CSP. The participation rate of peers positively aﬀects an
individual’s probability of participation: a 2 percentage point increase in
the participation rate of one’s peers increases an individual’s probability of
participating by 1 percentage point. As for the probability of separating
from the employer, workers identifying themselves as Hispanic are nearly
10 percentage points more likely to separate than those identifying them-
selves as white; workers of Asian descent are over 11 percentage points less
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positions are over 14 percentage points less likely to separate than those in
supervisory roles. Participation in CSP has the largest eﬀect on retention:
it reduces the probability of separating within ﬁve years by nearly 48 per-
centage points. The correlation between the error terms is positive and
marginally signiﬁcant (p-value of 0.15). A positive correlation implies that
those individuals who are more likely to participate in CSP are also more
inclined to separate from the employer within ﬁve years. Hence, by failing
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Table 6.9 Determinants of participating in CSP and separating from ﬁrm within 5
years (existing hires)
Hired before Sept. 1999
Bivariate probit model Pr(P = 1) Pr(S = 1)




















Ln of weekly wage (in thousands), $2001 –0.009 –0.027
(0.012) (0.019)
Participation in CSP by peers (%) 0.009
(0.003)***




Note: Numbers reﬂect dF/dX values; standard errors in parentheses.
aMeasured as of Dec. 15 of initial year observed.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.to account for endogenous participation behavior, the eﬀect of participa-
tion on retention is underestimated.
The estimated eﬀect of participation in CSP on retention in tables 6.9 and
6.10 uses a speciﬁcation in which the type of degree pursued does not mat-
ter for separation rates. A second speciﬁcation is found in tables 6.11
through 6.14, which allows the eﬀect to vary by degree pursued. Tables 6.11
and 6.12 give the estimates for how pursuing an undergraduate in CSP
aﬀects retention. The eﬀect is negative for both groups of hires: the proba-
bility of leaving within ﬁve years is reduced by 11 percentage points for
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Table 6.10 Determinants of participating in CSP and separating from ﬁrm within 5
years (new hires)
Hired after Sept. 1999
Bivariate probit model Pr(P = 1) Pr(S = 1)




















Ln of weekly wage (in thousands), $2001 0.043 –0.027
(0.017)** (0.019)
Participation in CSP by peers (%) 0.005
(0.002)***
Correlation between Errors 0.435
0
Log-likelihood –2,063.7
No. of observations 2,451
Note: Numbers reﬂect dF/dX values; standard errors in parentheses.
aMeasured as of Dec. 15 of initial year observed.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.those hired before September 1, 1999, and 56 percentage points for the
group of new hires. However, the eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant for
those hired before September 1, 1999. For those hired after the introduction
of CSP, the correlation between the error terms is positive and signiﬁcant.
The eﬀects of pursuing a graduate degree in CSP on retention for the two
cohorts of employees are listed in tables 6.13 and 6.14. Again, the eﬀect of
pursuing a graduate degree diﬀers across the two cohorts of employees. For
those hired before CSP was implemented, pursuing a graduate degree in-
creases the probability of separating from the institution by nearly 28 per-
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Table 6.11 Determinants of pursuing an undergraduate degree and separating from
ﬁrm within 5 years (existing hires)
Hired before Sept. 1999
Bivariate probit model Pr(P = 1) Pr(S = 1)




















Ln of weekly wage (in thousands), $2001 0.005 0.001
(0.007) (0.027)
Participation in CSP by peers (%) 0.003
(0.001)*
Correlation between errors –0.194
0.474
Log-likelihood 3,642.4
No. of observations 5,222
Note: Numbers reﬂect dF/dX values; standard errors in parentheses.
aMeasured as of Dec. 15 of initial year observed.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.centage points (statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level). The corre-
lation between the errors is negative for this group and statistically signiﬁ-
cant, meaning that those who are more likely to pursue a graduate degree
are also more likely to remain with the employer. For workers hired on or
after September 1, 1999, pursuing a graduate degree reduces the probabil-
ity of leaving within ﬁve years by 49 percentage points. Similar to workers
in this cohort who pursued an undergraduate degree, the correlation be-
tween the errors is positive.
These results indicate that participation in CSP substantially increases
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Table 6.12 Determinants of pursuing an undergraduate degree and separating from
ﬁrm within 5 years (new hires)
Hired after Sept. 1999
Bivariate probit model Pr(P = 1) Pr(S = 1)




















Ln of weekly wage (in thousands), $2001 0.013 –0.283
(0.009) (0.042)***
Participation in CSP by peers (%) 0.001
(0.001)*
Correlation between errors 0.894
(0.435)**
Log-likelihood 1,760.1
No. of observations 2,451
Note: Numbers reﬂect dF/dX values; standard errors in parentheses.
aMeasured as of Dec. 15 of initial year observed.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.the retention of those employees hired after the program was implemented;
however, participation has a weak negative eﬀect on retention for those
employees hired before the introduction of CSP. The diﬀerential eﬀect
across the two cohorts suggests that the introduction of the program
aﬀected the pool of workers attracted to and hired by the employer. The re-
sults from tables 6.5 and 6.6 show that the observable individual factors
that aﬀect participation are diﬀerent across the two groups. More impor-
tant for estimating the eﬀect of participation on separation rates, the two
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Table 6.13 Determinants of pursuing a graduate degree and separating from ﬁrm
within 5 years (existing hires)
Hired before Sept. 1999
Bivariate probit model Pr(P = 1) Pr(S = 1)




















Ln of weekly wage (in thousands), $2001 –0.013 0.002
(0.009) (0.027)
Participation in CSP by peers (%) 0.006
(0.002)***
Correlation between errors –0.497
(0.182)**
Log-likelihood –3,796.7
No. of observations 5,222
Note: Numbers reﬂect dF/dX values; standard errors in parentheses.
aMeasured as of Dec. 15 of initial year observed.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.groups diﬀer in terms of the correlation between the unobservable factors
that aﬀect the participation and retention decisions. For those hired on or
after September 1, 1999, there is a strong positive correlation between the
probability of participating in CSP and separating from the employer.
Hence, estimating the eﬀect of CSP on the probability of separation in a
single-equation framework underestimates the impact of participation on
retention. Participation in CPS decreases the probability of separating
from the employer within ﬁve years by 48 percentage points when partici-
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Table 6.14 Determinants of pursuing a graduate degree and separating from ﬁrm
within 5 years (new hires)
Hired after Sept. 1999
Bivariate probit model Pr(P = 1) Pr(S = 1)




















Ln of weekly wage (in thousands), $2001 0.024 –0.282
(0.013)* (0.044)***
Participation in CSP by peers (%) 0.003
(0.001)**
Correlation between errors 0.497
0.361
Log-likelihood –1,940.9
No. of observations 2,451
Note: Numbers reﬂect dF/dX values; standard errors in parentheses.
aMeasured as of Dec. 15 of initial year observed.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.pation is treated as endogenous, substantially higher than the 22 percent-
age point decrease in the probability of separation when participation is
treated as exogenous.
For employees hired before CSP was implemented, the correlation be-
tween the unobservable factors aﬀecting participation in CSP and separa-
tion from the employer is negative, meaning that those workers who are
more likely to participate have higher attachment to the institution. Hence,
the estimated eﬀect of participation on separation rates treating participa-
tion as exogenous overestimates the eﬀect on retention. The eﬀect of par-
ticipating in CSP using a single-equation framework is a 21 percentage
point decrease in the probability of separating from the employer; however,
when we treat participation as endogenous, the eﬀect changes signs (be-
comes a 10 percentage point increase) and loses statistical signiﬁcance.
This case study ﬁnds that tuition reimbursement programs substantially
increase the retention of new hires. Hence, this chapter ﬁnds empirical sup-
port for the explanation given by ﬁrms for providing tuition reimbursement
programs—to increase employee retention—despite the predictions of the
standard theory of human capital that provision of general training would
increase turnover. It is important to note that implementation of a program
appears to aﬀect current and future employees diﬀerentially; this diﬀerence
provides some evidence that tuition programs aﬀect the composition of a
ﬁrm’s applicant pool. Because of the prevalence of these programs, the re-
sults regarding new hires are likely to be most useful to employers.
6.5 Interpreting the Results
The result that participation in employer-provided general training pro-
grams increases worker retention contradicts the predictions of Becker’s
standard model of investment in human capital. However, there are pos-
sible mechanisms by which this result can be reconciled within standard
theory. The ﬁrst is the structure of tuition reimbursement programs, which
Cappelli (2004) takes note of in his analysis.19Recall that eligibility for CSP
is subject to a one-year service length requirement, which mechanically re-
duces the turnover rate for participants relative to nonparticipants in the
ﬁrst year. In addition, the duration of coursework increases attachment
while the employee is participating because he or she needs to successfully
complete the course, as well as continue employment, to receive his or 
her reimbursement. After course completion, however, this mechanism is
no longer operative, and the worker’s propensity to separate would in-
crease. If this is the primary mechanism creating increased retention, then
Becker’s theory would be applicable following course completion.
The raw plots of the survival functions begin to address this concern. As
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19. This point was also rightly emphasized by one of the referees for this volume.discussed in section 6.4.1, ﬁgure 6.4 plots the Kaplan-Meier survival func-
tions for participants relative to nonparticipants, separating those par-
ticipants who are pursuing majors vastly unrelated to their jobs (Not 
Job-Related) from the remaining participants (Job-Related). The survival
function of the Not Job-Related group can be interpreted as showing the
pure mechanical retention eﬀect attributable to the tuition program’s
structure: the survival rate for this group is initially higher than nonpartic-
ipants, but then drops below after three years of service. The survival func-
tion of participants in the Job-Related group starts above that of nonpar-
ticipants and remains above throughout the duration of the data. While
these results are not deﬁnitive, they suggest that the retention eﬀect is
stronger than that simply implied by the program’s structure.
An alternative explanation is that the general skills acquired through tu-
ition reimbursement programs make the worker more productive at the
current ﬁrm relative to outside employers through complementarities be-
tween ﬁrm-speciﬁc and general human capital. If complementarities exist
between general and ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital in production, general
skills acquired through participation in tuition reimbursement could in-
crease the productivity of ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital, thereby increasing
employee retention. Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a, b) argue that if general
and ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital are complements, wage structures could
become compressed, thereby giving ﬁrms an incentive to provide general
skills training.20 The complementarities mechanism implies that the eﬀect
of participation on retention would persist after coursework has been com-
pleted.
It is important to note that complementarity between general and ﬁrm-
speciﬁc skills is not necessary for tuition programs to have a continued
eﬀect on retention after courses are completed. Other mechanisms could
result in this eﬀect in there is investment in ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital.
For tuition reimbursement programs, participation would increase the
amount of ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills if these skills are acquired over calendar time
(or tenure) because coursework takes several semesters to complete. Ser-
vice length requirements before and after participation would result in ad-
ditional investment (Cappelli 2004). Alternatively, Lazear (2005) presents
a model in which all skills are general, but how these skills are combined in
production is speciﬁc to the ﬁrm. Hence, in his model, providing general
skills training is essentially equivalent to investing in ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills,
which would result in increased retention. In addition, ﬁrms could use gen-
eral training as an insurance mechanism: if workers are reluctant to work
at a ﬁrm that requires investment in ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital due to the
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20. Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a, b) deﬁne compression in the wage structure to mean that
proﬁts from trained workers are higher than those from untrained workers. They list several
other market imperfections that could result in compressed wages, including search costs,
mobility costs, and minimum wage laws.risk of wage loss in the event of involuntary separation, ﬁrms could oﬀer
general training as a way to mitigate this risk and thereby encourage in-
vestment in ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills (Feuer, Glick, and Desai 1987).
Examining the eﬀect of participation on retention after course comple-
tion is one way to test the role of ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital relative to the
mechanical eﬀect due to the structure of these tuition programs. However,
the data used in this analysis are not well suited for this test because they
do not include exact course dates or departure dates, just the year in which
participation and separation occur. This analysis attempts to capture the
eﬀect on retention following degree completion by using a ﬁve-year win-
dow for the separation outcome, but this measure is not ideal. Future work
should examine the eﬀect on retention following course completion as well
as the ﬁrm-level determinants of providing these programs to improve our
understanding of the role played by ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills.
6.6 Conclusion and Future Research
Tuition reimbursement programs are a type of general training program
commonly oﬀered by employers. Counter to the prediction of Becker’s the-
ory of investment in human capital, ﬁrms claim that they use these pro-
grams to increase employee retention. Results from the case study show
that participation in tuition reimbursement substantially reduces the prob-
ability of separating from the employer: participation by those employees
hired after the program was implemented reduced their probability of sep-
arating from the employer within ﬁve years by nearly 50 percentage points.
This result challenges the prediction of standard theory that investment in
general human capital by ﬁrms increases employee turnover. However,
there are several mechanisms that can explain this result within standard
theory, such as by allowing for an interaction between ﬁrm-speciﬁc and
general human capital. To evaluate the merits of this hypothesis relative to
others, such as the mechanical eﬀect on turnover due the structure of tu-
ition programs, future work should analyze the eﬀect of participation on
retention using data that include course and degree completion dates.
This case study analysis also provides evidence that oﬀering tuition re-
imbursement aﬀects the type of worker attracted to the ﬁrm. The partici-
pation rate in the program is signiﬁcantly higher for new hires relative to
existing hires, and the determinants of participation also vary across the
two cohorts. After taking into account the interdependence between par-
ticipation and retention decisions, the eﬀect of the program on the proba-
bility of separation diﬀers across the cohorts as well. Future work could ex-
amine the eﬀect of this program on retention rates over a longer time
horizon to see if the diﬀerence between the two cohorts persists.
A shortcoming of the case study analysis is whether the ﬁndings can be
generalized to other employers and programs. While the tuition reim-
226 Colleen Flaherty Manchesterbursement program is typical in terms of its program characteristics, future
work should examine the eﬀect of tuition reimbursement programs on
turnover rates using the cross section of ﬁrms, such as those surveyed in the
SEPT95.
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